Tit-for-Tat

It seems we're back to the old game. Russian President Vladimir Putin said recently that they may point their missiles at European targets in response to American plans to set up missile defenses in Eastern Europe. Although the Russia-US word war has been going on for months, this is the first time Putin has made such a strong threat.

First some background: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union in 1972 to put a halt to the Cold War arms race. One of its basic principles was mutually assured destruction (MAD)-- any country that launches a nuke could expect a quick and equal retaliation, making both countries unlikely to press the trigger. Thus, an important stipulation of the treaty was a ban on missile defense systems that would render MAD inapplicable, which would increase the likelihood of a first strike and foment an arms race to overwhelm whatever defense system is in place. However, in 2002 the US unilaterally pulled out of the ABM Treaty, saying it needed to develop missile defense systems to fend off possible attacks from Iran or North Korea.

An important assumption in MAD is the rationality of all parties-- an irrational player could still launch and not care about the consequences. During the Cold War there were only two nuclear-armed parties to consider-- the United States (and its satellite states in NATO) and the Soviet Union. Both parties were rational even if brinkmanship was a common game (think Cuban missile crisis).

For a presumably rational US to pull out of the ABM Treaty it had to believe that other irrational players have come into play, in this case Iran and North Korea. Both Iran and North Korea have long-range missile capabilites (none can hit the US mainland), and North Korea has confirmed nucelar capabilities albeit still weak. Thus, the US is willing to risk the ire of rational Russia to fend off the threat from potentially irrational and nuclear-armed Iran or North Korea.

So is this calculus correct? Well, it is true that there are now more players in the nuclear game, but only two pose a serious threat to the United States-- Russia and, to a lesser extent, China-- and they're both rational players. Iran has no demonstrable nuclear capabilities as of now, and its missiles can only reach as far as Israel (it won't think of hitting Arab countries, Turkey, or Russia). Iran has not shown any tendency towards irrational behaviour, and all its strategies seem to be in line with rational thinking. On the other hand, North Korea can theoretically hit Alaska if it's lucky; its missiles are more likely to hit the ocean assuming they can get them off the ground. While North Korea has shown bouts of irrational behaviour in the past, this can be viewed as part of its brinkmanship strategy which, rationally speaking, it has played so well.

It does not seem that the US is in any serious threat from ICBMs, so why build defenses in Eastern Europe and bring back Russia into the tit-for-tat game? A missile defense against Iran should be placed in Israel, not Eastern Europe. On the other hand, missile defenses against North Korea should be placed in California, Canada, and Alaska. Moreover, the biggest nucelar threat to the US is not from ICBMs or cruise missiles, but from dirty bombs carried by Al Qaeda and its sympathisers. The Eastern Europe defense shield will be useless against backpack nuclear bombs.

While the US may have valid concerns over nuclear proliferation, it seems that its decision to irk Russia by building nuclear capabilities in its doorstep is a miscalculation of the costs and benefits. It gains very little in facing its stated security threats, but loses a lot in terms of a new arms race with Russia (and China). Russia has already tested new missiles designed to thwart the latest American missile defenses, so the first step in a new arms race has begun.

The irony of MAD is that when one party tries to eliminate the ability of the opposing party to retaliate, it increases the likelihood that the other party will strike first because failure to do so will ensure its exclusive destruction. So in trying to eliminate a threat (real or imagined) from small players (Iran and North Korea), the US has significantly increased the threat from a big player (Russia). Moreover, the clear and present threat from the truly irrational player (Al Qaeda) is in no way mitigated by this strategy.

Makes one wonder who is really the most irrational player in this game.