Phone Scam: Identity Theft in Manila

First, this is not from some floating email-- this happened to me, twice.  I already reported it to one of the banks mentioned and it seems they're not aware of it happening-- they were very appreciative that I reported it to them.  Read this and be warned.

It seems Filipino scammers are getting into identity theft these days.  It begins with your name and phone number-- how they get it, how they got mine, I don't know.  The caller, usually a female, will say you have been pre-approved for a credit card or a loan, and will even explain what you can get (loan amount, interest rates, terms of payment, etc.).  Then they will ask you for information for security purposes, ostensibly to confirm that you are who you say you are.  Here's my experience:

Incident 1: Caller claimed to be from Metrobank Blumentritt branch, said I was pre-approved for a credit card.  I actually have a pending credit card application with Metrobank, so this wasn't a complete surprise to me.  She asked for my birthday, which I gave thinking my card application has been approved.  Then she asked for my mother's maiden name and billing address, which sounded alarm bells in my head.  I told her they should know that information and they can just send the card to my billing address.  She was irritated and asked for my information again, saying that my card will be cancelled if I don't give it to her. I refused and asked for her contact information instead.  She refused, said my card will be cancelled, and hung up.

Incident 2: Caller claimed to be from Citibank Savings Ortigas branch, said I was pre-approved for a car or home loan.  She went on to say that I can borrow from P300k to P2M, low interest, three to 12 years to pay, etc.  She then asked for my credit card number, monthly income, and taxpayer identification number (TIN).  I refused to give the info and lied about my income just to get more information from her.  I got her name and contact info and reported her to Citibank Savings Ortigas-- the real one-- and they were unaware that such a scam was taking place.  I told them to warn their customers because a Citibank customer who is unaware of the scam might have given up the info.  They were very happy I brought this to their attention.

Piece of advice-- never give information to unsolicited callers, even if they claim to be from your bank.  They should know the information they are asking from you, and if you think it might actually be your bank, call them yourself using a publicly listed number and go from there.  

If you get a similar call, get as much information on the caller and report it to the bank concerned (get their number from their official website).  They will be more than happy to know that their name is being used illicitly and will take actions to protect their customers.

Lastly, be careful.  They know your name and telephone number, so they probably know where you live.  Don't let them know you're onto them.  Just ride out the call and don't give any vital information.

Frat Violence... Again

Seems frat violence reared its ugly head-- again-- at UP, this time along AS Walk on a Tuesday morning. I don't really care if these frat guys kill each other, so long as they don't hurt (or even inconvenience) non-participants when they do so. It would really be better for everyone if they just do their mutual killing away from school grounds (and away from any kind of civilisation, for that matter).

That said, I have to say I'm getting sick and tired of the predictable statements and rallies of outrage coming from UP student leaders, the latest from the ironically-named UP-SAWA. Really, is that the best the UP community can do? Make statements or hold rallies?

The law and the SDT have their hands tied when it comes to punishing these people-- the Mendez and Dungo cases are testaments to that. Add to that the fact that these frat guys usually have rich and powerful brods, who ensure they have only the best lawyers defending them. Waiting for the law and the SDT to punish these people is like waiting for pigs to evolve wings.

So if they cannot be punished legally, why not punish them socially? Ostracise them. Make them pariahs. Turn them into untouchables. If a frat is invioled in a rumble, kick out all their members from organisations, committes, and councils. Bar their members from attending any university or college activity. Extricate them from university life. Tell them that their brod's actions-- and their defence or tolerance of them-- are unacceptable. Tell them that there will be no forgiveness or reconciliation until they hang their erring brods out to dry, or they resign from their frat (which some brave men did after the Mendez case).

UP-SAWA's statement calls on everyone to "to take small but significant steps within their personal circles to continuously and emphatically condemn any and all forms of fraternity-related violence". Are they now ready to sever their academic and personal ties from members of the frats they so "continuously and emphatically condemn"? Are they ready to put their money where their statement is?

All for one and one for all implies the acceptance of collective punishment, so give it to them. Since the law doesn't seem to be any disincentive against frat violence, maybe social ostracisation will send the message home. Kung wala silang hiya, hiyain nalang sila.

Crime and the withdrawal of human rights

By now you've probably heard about the horrendous crime that happened in Laguna. We hear about violent crime everyday and mostly we are desensitised to them, taking refuge in abstraction, anonymity, and distance. But the events in Laguna really jar the psyche-- the magnitude of violence, the cold calculation of the murderers, the everydayness of the victims.

My condolences to the families of the victims-- their cries for vengeance are understandable and, I say, justified. As for the perpetrators, they should be punished in the most painful and protracted way possible.

That said, let me discuss human rights, which I'm sure the perpetrators will seek refuge in if they are caught and found guilty. Of course the accused, who are presumed innocent, should be accorded due process and all the protection under the law. But what do we do with those who are guilty of the most violent and heinous of crimes? What basis is there to say that the death penalty should be off the table? Generally, what rights of criminals, who despite their actions remain biologically human, may or may not be withdrawn?

Human rights are the set of rights and freedoms that everyone is endowed with by virtue of being born human. No one is born without human rights, and no action is required to acquire these rights. Everyone is entitled to the protection of their human rights, and no one may deny others these rights. However, one can do actions (i.e., criminal activity) that result in the State's (as the representative of society) legitimate and just withdrawal of some of these rights. For example, Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declares that "everyone has the right to freedom of movement". But incarceration-- a withdrawal of this right-- is a universally accepted penalty for criminal activity. So if Article 13 of the UDHR can be withdrawn as a consequence of certain crimes, why not, say, Article 3 (right to life) or Article 5 (protection from torture or cruel punishment)?

One argument is that some human rights are inalienable (e.g., right to life) and others are not (e.g., right to free movement). Alston (2005), who famously visited our country last year, puts it softer as the prioritisation of human rights, that some rights are more important than others and should thus be pursued more rigourously. Accepting that such a dichotomy of human rights exists, how do we detrmine which ones are inalienable (or more important) and thus cannot be withdrawn as a consequence of criminal activity?

Answers based on the Divine, religion, or some "self-evident" truths are flimsy because they cease to persuade once the underlying assertions and dogmas are disputed-- they are only persuasive for the converted. Natural law, social contract, Kantian morality, and evolutionary game theoretic arguments provide sound bases for the universal existence and protection of human rights, but give no objective limits on the punishment for those who violate them.

The strongest argument against the withdrawal of some human rights is the imperfection of the judicial system-- errors can occur and the innocent may be convicted. In this case, certain rights should not be withdrawn if there is a nonzero probability that the convict is actually innocent, especially if the withdrawal of such rights cannot be reversed. Indeed, it is better to err on the side of protecting human rights than withdrawing them. [I use a similar line of argument in my stand on abortion.] However, this is a practical argument that has no bearing on the merits of what punishments should or should not be allowed. After all, this argument falters if there is absolute certainty that the convicted criminal is guilty (say, there is untampered video of him shooting the victims).

The way I see it, the set of human rights that can be withdrawn as a consequence of criminal activity is a matter of social choice. There is no objective reason why some punishments should be allowed and others should be prohibited-- it all depends on the preferences of society. Thus, if society decides that violent criminals like the Laguna robbers should receive capital punishment (i.e., their right to life should be withdrawn), there is no objective reason to say that this should not be done; the only real constraint is society's sensibilities and public opinion.

Violent crimes like the Laguna robberies strain the rationale behind the limits on their punishment. If we subscribe to the social contract theory of human rights, a criminal should be deemed to have surrendered all his human rights if he decides to use violence on his victim. Perpetrators of heinous and violent crimes, if we are absolutely certain of their guilt, should be punished harshly, severely, and mercilessly.

If you disagree with me, do leave a reply and set me right.

Lest We Forget

PROCLAMATION No. 1081 September 21, 1972

PROCLAIMING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES

x x x

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph ('2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated in Orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered re- leased by me or by my duly designated representative.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy two.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines

Amen! (3)

By now you all know that former President Joseph Estrada was found guilty of plunder. I was going to comment on the events that happened since the verdict, particularly on what's been said in many quarters. However, my thoughts were exactly captured by the Inquirer's editiorial today. Usually I just give the link when I make one of my Amen! posts, but this editorial merits a full paste.
---
Legal Insanity
Philippine Daily Inquirer Editorial, 17 September 2007

MANILA, Philippines - Those who choose to view the Estrada verdict as a half-empty glass of dubious water are not doing the country any favors. Yes, other plunderers continue to roam the land. Yes, Mr. ex-Marcos justice minister Estelito Mendoza, other public officials continue to rake in enormous amounts of commissions from jueteng, and plunder cases can be filed against them. (Would you like to start the ball rolling?) And yes, certain scandals since Joseph Estrada fled Malacañang call for the most severe legal accounting.

But do these extraneous facts diminish Estrada’s guilt one whit?

Lawyers who think so are indulging a form of legal insanity. They taint the legal process with innuendo or outright contempt, unmindful of or uncaring about their impact on the rule of law itself. What do they want to do, run themselves out of a job?

As we have said time and again, both the Arroyo administration and the Estrada camp have sought to politicize the plunder trial. But the conduct of the Sandiganbayan justices themselves and their measured decision prove that the anti-graft court’s Special Division confined itself to the facts and the law of the case at hand.

To be sure, the stature of the principal defendant was not lost on the justices; the decision unfailingly refers to him as “FPres. Estrada,” apparently a new honorific. And as we saw on live television, the division’s three justices were ready to allow Estrada’s continued detention, pending final conviction, in his Tanay, Rizal rest house even before his defense counsel raised the possibility (or even after Estrada lawyer Rene Saguisag pandered to the off-site gallery by declaring, airily, that his client did not want special treatment). But we do not believe the rule of law suffered when the former president was accorded these minor courtesies.

It needs to be stressed: the court’s independence, as evidenced in its decision, is triumph enough. Its well-tempered decision on the plunder case, however, is a true legal landmark.

Those who insist that Estrada’s guilt is contingent on the sins, perceived or real, of the Arroyo administration are preaching a false and cynical faith. Not because these sins do not exist; they do, and the administration’s continuing refusal to testify in Congress about various scandals is the surest proof that it has something to hide. But because those who insist are attacking the very rule of law they claim to defend.

To use an unsavory but necessary analogy: Do we stop ourselves from pursuing a case against a rapist, because other rapists have gone scot-free or because other rapes have not been reported? This is not legal realism, or even the realpolitik of law; this is “weather-weather” defeatism, a cynic’s formula for anarchy.

Other plunderers roam the land? Then let’s throw the book at them too. The good thing is, now we can apply the vital lessons learned from the Estrada plunder trial.
Perhaps first on the list: Involve private lawyers in the preparation and the prosecution. Private law firms can bring otherwise unavailable financial resources and litigation expertise to bear on the case, complementing the work of government prosecutors.

Support government lawyers to the hilt, not least in the matter of which state witnesses to use (necessarily a decision with political considerations). Over-prove the charges, not only through the use of incontrovertible documentary evidence but also through redundant corroborative testimony. And while landing a Chavit Singson is both distasteful but necessary, build the real case with the help of a Clarissa Ocampo—upstanding witnesses with unimpeachable credibility.

It’s tough work—and therefore all the more reason to praise the government prosecutors led by Dennis Villa-Ignacio (and spearheaded once upon a time by then-Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo). Tough and—if you listen to the snide Saguisag—fundamentally thankless. Estrada’s lawyers believe they had a monopoly not only on the truth of the case but even on sincerity of conviction. It is our duty to disabuse them of their final illusion.

Amen! (2)

Judge shuts out Trillanes

How right Judge Pimentel is not to "parrot" the special treatment to Erap and Nur. Enough of this insanity of special treatment for special prisoners-- it makes a mockery of the concept of blind justice. Maybe the Sandiganbayan should learn a thing or two from Pimentel.

But, of course, comes the criticism: Beltran: `Ruling on Trillanes betrays govt fears'. Immediately, Pimentel's decision is politicised-- the one instance where a judge makes a decision not based on politics but on the rule of law, he gets politicised. (Ok, I can't know whether or not Pimentel decided sans political considerations, but his reasoning-- or the snippets published-- seems to be in the right place.) I guess cases involving politicians will always be politicised.

Now the administration can lay claim to rule of law and equal application of justice, while the opposition is reduced to politicising the judiciary. Sigh. Comments like Beltran's based on partisan knee-jerk just help prop up this bankrupt administration. Paraphrasing Burke: The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to constantly put their feet in their mouth.

Law & Order: Trial by Technicality

The Supreme Court recently announced that it will amend the rules on criminal procedure, possibly even the rules on evidence. Reforms of any kind-- legal, economic, political-- give us a chance to compare what is and what ought to be. Now, I'm nowhere near an expert in legal theory and am not a practitioner of law, but I'd like to take a look at some of the rules on evidence, particularly the so-called poisonous tree. Please bear with me if I mix up my legal terms or processes; feel free to educate me. To lay my point let us consider a hypothetical but very likely situation:

[thun-thun]

An eight-year-old girl goes missing in the park; a few metres from where she was playing, blood and several teeth are found by passers-by. SOCO confirm that the blood and teeth belong to the missing girl. SPO4 Lenny Brusko investigates-- there are no witnesses to the attack and abduction, and there is no evidence in the scene that can point to any suspect. However, some witnesses say they saw Manny Yakis-- a known violent sex offender who recently got out of prison-- walking in the park on the day the girl disappeared, but no one can say that there was any contact between the two. Brusko, after 30 years on the job, has a hunch that Yakis is their guy.

Brusko invites Yakis for questioning. Yakis is careful with his answers, giving Brusko nothing but leering eyes and tonnes of frustration. Jack Makoy, the fiscal who will prosecute the case, says they don't have enough evidence on Yakis to secure an arrest or search warrant. With no other leads to follow, Brusko stakes out Yakis' apartment.

After three days of staking out and no other sources of evidence in sight, Brusko is getting very worried, believing that the girl is being harmed in the apartment. Claiming he heard a scream from inside Yakis' apartment, Brusko breaks down the door and finds the body of the missing girl, along with the club that broke several of her teeth in the park, the plastic-lined duffel bag which he used to cary the girl, and the kitchen knife he used to stab her. Brusko immediately arrests Yakis, knocking the perp unconscious in the scuffle. The coroner identifies the cause of death as loss of blood due to multiple stab wounds-- she has been dead for two days. Yakis' semen is found on the girl's body. Confronted with this evidence, Yakis, alone with Brusko and a camcorder in the interrogation room, confesses to the crime. He is then assigned a public attorney for his trial.

During the arraignment, Yakis' defense attorney files a motion to throw away all evidence gathered from Yakis' apartment because they were found in a warrantless search-- he can prove beyond any doubt that the scream Brusko supposedly heard never happened. The attorney also files a motion to throw away the confession because (1) this was brought about by evidence from the warrantless search and (2) Yakis wasn't informed of his rights when he was arrested because Brusko knocked him unconscious. Noting that the police and prosecution have no other evidence on Yakis aside from those gathered in his apartment, the defense attorney files a motion to dismiss the case due to lack of evidence.

Under current rules of evidence, the judge has no choice but to grant the defense attorney's motions to throw away all evidence on Yakis because they are all fruits of the poisonous tree-- they are all tainted evidence. Brusko conducted a warrantless search and lied about exigent circumstances, and Yakis' confession was obtained without him knowing about his rights. The judge will have to dismiss the case due to lack of admissible evidence because he will have to pretend that he never saw the girl's body and the perp's confession. Even if the judge rules that double jeopardy does not apply, Yakis will remain free unless Brusko can find evidence that is not in any way linked to the contents of the apartment.

I clearly understand the need to prevent agents of the State from committing abuses such as warrantless arrests and searches. No one wants to see overzealous detectives overstep the rights of the accused-- allowing one noble detective to overstep the lines will lead to other less noble ones doing the same and before we know it it's as if the Magna Carta never existed. There is a clear need to protect people from the State's agents given their immense powers.

But is it really in the interest of justice and human rights to overlook what we know is true? In the case above, two people committed crimes: Yakis and Brusko. If the judge does not admit the evidence and dismisses the case, Yakis and Brusko will both go free (ok, Brusko will have a bad day, maybe a stern warning from his boss) but the real victims-- the girl and her family-- will be denied justice. How can a wrong correct two wrongs?

I understand that the purpose of the doctrine on tainted evidence is to prevent abuses by agents of the State. But instead of completely ignoring the truth, even from tainted evidence, why not simply criminalise acts that taint the evidence? Say, life in prison for a warratntless search or illegal wiretap, or the errant cop joins the perp in jail for the duration of the latter's sentence. This way the criminal goes to jail along with the abusive agent of the State, giving justice to both the victims and the criminal justice system.

I'm not arguing that the end justifies the means; on the contrary, agents of the State who abuse their power should be punished harshly, even as harsh as the criminals they convict. But I think it's wrong to deny the truth-- to pretend that what we know as true does not exist-- just to punish those who abuse their police powers. In fact, the present doctrine on tainted evidence is incentive incompatible-- those who abuse their powers (i.e., agents of the State) are not held personally liable for their actions. Their punishment, if you can call it that, comes mainly in the form of dismissed cases. There is a mismatch between the crime, which is a personal decision by the abusive agent, and the punishment, which is borne by society in the form of a dismissed case (not to mention a criminal on the loose). We want agents of the State to do their jobs well, within the bounds of the law, and respecting the rights of the accused-- I think the prospect of a long prison term provides more of a deterrent against abuse than potentially dismissed cases.

I can't see how ignoring facts, wherever they're from, helps the cause of justice. It's weak as a deterrent and does not really hit abusive agents of the State where it hurts. Now that we are considering revising the rules on criminal procedure and evidence, what is the philosophical reason not to change the doctrine on tainted evidence and fruits of the poisoned tree? Aren't justice and the justice system served by considering the facts-- all facts-- and punishing all who did wrong?

As I said earlier, I'm nowhere near an expert in legal theory and am not a practitioner of law. If you are, and you think I'm way off, please educate me.